鲁达 [转载]Is Google Making Us Stupid 全译本（part 2）
原文地址：Is Google Making Us Stupid 全译本（part 2）作者：greedytiger
（续上一帖）
As we use what the sociologist Daniel Bell has called our “intellectual technologies”—the tools that extend our mental rather than our physical capacities—we inevitably begin to take on the qualities of those technologies. The mechanical clock, which came into common use in the 14th century, provides a compelling example. In Technics and Civilization, the historian and cultural critic Lewis Mumford described how the clock “disassociated time from human events and helped create the belief in an independent world of mathematically measurable sequences.” The “abstract framework of divided time” became “the point of reference for both action and thought.”
在我们运用社会学家丹尼尔·贝尔所称的“智 力技术”的时候，即那些扩展我们的思维能力而不是体力的工具，我们不可避免地开始呈现那些技术的特性。十四世纪开始大量使用的机械钟表就是一个明证。在其 所著《技术与文明》一书中，历史学家、文化批评家刘易斯·曼福德描绘了钟表是如何“把时间跟人类活动分离出来，帮助人们形成一种观念，即时间是一个由可以 进行数学测量的序列构成的独立世界。”这种“抽象的可分割的时间框架”成为了人们“行动和思维的参照点”。
The clock’s methodical ticking helped bring into being the scientific mind and the scientific man. But it also took something away. As the late MIT computer scientist Joseph Weizenbaum observed in his 1976 book, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation, the conception of the world that emerged from the widespread use of timekeeping instruments “remains an impoverished version of the older one, for it rests on a rejection of those direct experiences that formed the basis for, and indeed constituted, the old reality.” In deciding when to eat, to work, to sleep, to rise, we stopped listening to our senses and started obeying the clock.
钟表规则有序的滴答运行帮助产生了有条理的思维和有条理的人。但是它也带走了某些东西。正如麻省理工学院已故计算机科学家约瑟夫·魏辰堡在其1976年 的著作《计算机能力与人类判断力：从判断走向计算》中指出的那样，计时器的大规模使用所产生的人们对于世界的感知“是旧有感知的一个更为贫乏的版本，因为 它基于对直接经历的抛弃，而这些直接经历是形成旧有现实世界的基础，或者说就构成了原来的现实世界。”在决定何时吃饭，何时工作，何时睡觉，何时起床时， 我们不再听从我们的感觉，而是开始服从于时钟。
The process of adapting to new intellectual technologies is reflected in the changing metaphors we use to explain ourselves to ourselves. When the mechanical clock arrived, people began thinking of their brains as operating “like clockwork.” Today, in the age of software, we have come to think of them as operating “like computers.” But the changes, neuroscience tells us, go much deeper than metaphor. Thanks to our brain’s plasticity, the adaptation occurs also at a biological level.
我们适应这些智力技术的过程也在我们用来进 行自我阐释的那些不断变化的隐喻中得到了体现。机械钟表发明后，人们开始认为他们的大脑是在“像钟表一样”运行，在今天这个软件时代，我们开始认为我们的 大脑是在“像电脑一样”运转。但是，神经科学告诉我们，这些变化，远比这些隐喻所表现的要深刻得多。托我们大脑可塑性的福，在生物学层面上，这种适应也在 发生。
The Internet promises to have particularly far-reaching effects on cognition. In a paper published in 1936, the British mathematician Alan Turing proved that a digital computer, which at the time existed only as a theoretical machine, could be programmed to perform the function of any other information-processing device. And that’s what we’re seeing today. The Internet, an immeasurably powerful computing system, is subsuming most of our other intellectual technologies. It’s becoming our map and our clock, our printing press and our typewriter, our calculator and our telephone, and our radio and TV.
互联网必将对于人类认知产生一些独特的深远影响。在其1936年 发表的一篇论文中，英国数学家阿兰·图灵证明，电子计算机——尽管当时还只是停留在理论上，将能够被编程来发挥任何信息处理装置能够起到的作用。这就是今 天我们所看到的情况。互联网这个难以估量的强大计算系统，正在涵盖我们绝大多数的智力技术。它正成为我们的钟表和地图，我们的印刷厂和打字机，我们的计算 器和电话，还有我们的收音机和电视机。
When the Net absorbs a medium, that medium is re-created in the Net’s image. It injects the medium’s content with hyperlinks, blinking ads, and other digital gewgaws, and it surrounds the content with the content of all the other media it has absorbed. A new e-mail message, for instance, may announce its arrival as we’re glancing over the latest headlines at a newspaper’s site. The result is to scatter our attention and diffuse our concentration.
每当网络吸纳一种媒体，这种媒体就被按照网 络的形象重塑。网络在这种媒体的内容中注入大量的超链接、令人生厌的广告以及其他数字化噱头，用它所吸纳的所有其他媒体的内容来包围这个媒体的内容。比 如，在我们浏览一家报社网站的最新头条的时候，会有声音响起，提示你收到了新的电子邮件。其结果是我们的注意力被分散。
The Net’s influence doesn’t end at the edges of a computer screen, either. As people’s minds become attuned to the crazy quilt of Internet media, traditional media have to adapt to the audience’s new expectations. Television programs add text crawls and pop-up ads, and magazines and newspapers shorten their articles, introduce capsule summaries, and crowd their pages with easy-to-browse info-snippets. When, in March of this year, The New York Times decided to devote the second and third pages of every edition to article abstracts , its design director, Tom Bodkin, explained that the “shortcuts” would give harried readers a quick “taste” of the day’s news, sparing them the “less efficient” method of actually turning the pages and reading the articles. Old media have little choice but to play by the new-media rules.
网络的影响远远超出了电脑屏幕的界限。当人 们的思维方式适应了互联网媒体百纳被式的呈现方式后，传统媒体也会做出改变，以迎合读者或观众的新期望。电视节目加入了滚动字幕和不断跳出的小广告，报刊 则缩短其文章的长度，引入一小块一小块的摘要，在版面上堆砌各种易于浏览的零碎信息。今年3月，《纽约时报》便决定将其第2和第3版改为内容精粹。其版面主管汤姆·博金解释说这些“捷径”可以使忙碌的读者可以快速“品尝”当天的新闻，免去他们“不那么高效”地翻阅版面阅读文章的麻烦。旧媒体别无选择，只有按照新媒体的规则来办。
Never has a communications system played so many roles in our lives—or exerted such broad influence over our thoughts—as the Internet does today. Yet, for all that’s been written about the Net, there’s been little consideration of how, exactly, it’s reprogramming us. The Net’s intellectual ethic remains obscure.
没有哪种沟通系统能像今天的互联网这样，在我们的生活中发挥如此众多的作用，或者说对我们的思维模式产生了如此广泛的影响。然而，在所有这些关于网络的著述中，很少有人思考互联网究竟是如何在对我们进行重新编程。网络的知识伦理仍然模糊不清。
About the same time that Nietzsche started using his typewriter, an earnest young man named Frederick Winslow Taylor carried a stopwatch into the Midvale Steel plant in Philadelphia and began a historic series of experiments aimed at improving the efficiency of the plant’s machinists. With the approval of Midvale’s owners, he recruited a group of factory hands, set them to work on various metalworking machines, and recorded and timed their every movement as well as the operations of the machines. By breaking down every job into a sequence of small, discrete steps and then testing different ways of performing each one, Taylor created a set of precise instructions—an “algorithm,” we might say today—for how each worker should work. Midvale’s employees grumbled about the strict new regime, claiming that it turned them into little more than automatons, but the factory’s productivity soared.
就在尼采开始使用打字机的几乎同时，一个叫 做弗雷德里克·温斯洛·泰勒的认真的年轻人带着一块秒表来到了费城的米德维尔钢铁厂，开始了一系列具有历史意义的实验，旨在提高钢厂机械工人的工作效率。 在征得米德维尔钢厂老板的同意后，他招募了工厂的一批工人，让他们在各种工作台上工作，记录下他们的每一个动作以及耗费的时间，还有机器的运行情况。他随 后把每一个工作分解成为一系列的微小步骤，并且测试完成各个步骤的不同方式。由此，泰勒给每个工人制定了精确的工作指南，今天我们可以称之为“算法”。米 德维尔的雇员对这种严苛的新体制颇多抱怨，认为这把他们变得跟机器人并无二致，但是工厂的生产力大幅攀升。
More than a hundred years after the invention of the steam engine, the Industrial Revolution had at last found its philosophy and its philosopher. Taylor’s tight industrial choreography—his “system,” as he liked to call it—was embraced by manufacturers throughout the country and, in time, around the world. Seeking maximum speed, maximum efficiency, and maximum output, factory owners used time-and-motion studies to organize their work and configure the jobs of their workers. The goal, as Taylor defined it in his celebrated 1911 treatise, The Principles of Scientific Management, was to identify and adopt, for every job, the “one best method” of work and thereby to effect “the gradual substitution of science for rule of thumb throughout the mechanic arts.” Once his system was applied to all acts of manual labor, Taylor assured his followers, it would bring about a restructuring not only of industry but of society, creating a utopia of perfect efficiency. “In the past the man has been first,” he declared; “in the future the system must be first.”
这样，在蒸汽机发明一百多年后，工业革命终 于迎来了它的哲学理念和哲学家。泰勒的严格工业步骤，或者“机制”——他自己喜欢这么叫——在全国范围内为工厂主们所欣然采纳，并及时推广至全世界。为了 追求最快速度、最高效率、最大产量，工厂主们采用时间—动作研究来组织生产、配置工人。正如泰勒在其1911年 那篇广为称道的论文《科学管理之原理》中所指出的那样，这样做的目的是要为每一件工作找出并采用“最好的方法”，从而“以科学来逐渐取代机械行业中的那些 基于经验的实用方法”。泰勒向其追随者保证，一旦其机制运用于所有手工劳作，将不仅导致产业的重构，还会导致社会的重构，创造出一个完美效率的理想之国。 他宣称：“过去人是第一位的，今后机制将是第一位的。”
Taylor’s system is still very much with us; it remains the ethic of industrial manufacturing. And now, thanks to the growing power that computer engineers and software coders wield over our intellectual lives, Taylor’s ethic is beginning to govern the realm of the mind as well. The Internet is a machine designed for the efficient and automated collection, transmission, and manipulation of information, and its legions of programmers are intent on finding the “one best method”—the perfect algorithm—to carry out every mental movement of what we’ve come to describe as “knowledge work.”
今天，泰勒的机制仍然在大量使用，它仍是工 业生产的伦理。现在，托计算机硬件和软件工程师们对于我们智力生活所拥有的巨大本领的福，泰勒的伦理开始主宰我们的大脑领域。互联网就是设计用来进行信息 的高效自动收集、传播和操控的机器。其庞大的程序员队伍致力于找到“一个最好的方法”——最好的算法——来实施我们称之为“知识工作”的每一个脑力活动。
Google’s headquarters, in Mountain View, California—the Googleplex—is the Internet’s high church, and the religion practiced inside its walls is Taylorism. Google, says its chief executive, Eric Schmidt, is “a company that’s founded around the science of measurement,” and it is striving to “systematize everything” it does. Drawing on the terabytes of behavioral data it collects through its search engine and other sites, it carries out thousands of experiments a day, according to the Harvard Business Review, and it uses the results to refine the algorithms that increasingly control how people find information and extract meaning from it. What Taylor did for the work of the hand, Google is doing for the work of the mind.
位于加利福尼亚山景地区的谷歌总部，就是互 联网的最高教堂，在其围墙之内所奉行的宗教就是泰勒主义。谷歌首席执行官埃里克·施密特说，该公司是“一家围绕测量科学建立起来的公司”，致力于“将一切 系统化”。据《哈佛商业评论》报道，谷歌利用从其搜索引擎和其他网站收集来的数以兆兆（TB）字节的海量行为数据，每天进行数以千计的实验，并将结果用来深化和完善其算法，这些算法越来越控制着人们如何找到信息并从中抽取感兴趣的内容。泰勒所运用于体力劳动的那一套，谷歌正在运用于脑力劳动。
The company has declared that its mission is “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.” It seeks to develop “the perfect search engine,” which it defines as something that “understands exactly what you mean and gives you back exactly what you want.” In Google’s view, information is a kind of commodity, a utilitarian resource that can be mined and processed with industrial efficiency. The more pieces of information we can “access” and the faster we can extract their gist, the more productive we become as thinkers.
谷歌还宣布，其使命是“将全世界的信息组织 起来，使之随处可得，随处可用。”它试图开发“完美的搜索引擎，”即谷歌所说的能够“准确领会你的意图，并精确地回馈给你所要的东西”的搜索引擎。按照谷 歌的观点，信息是一种商品，一种可以以工业效率来进行挖掘和处理的实用资源。我们能接触到的信息越多，提取其精髓越快，我们就会成为一个越高产的思想家。 问题是，它会使我们越变越蠢吗？
Where does it end? Sergey Brin and Larry Page, the gifted young men who founded Google while pursuing doctoral degrees in computer science at Stanford, speak frequently of their desire to turn their search engine into an artificial intelligence, a HAL-like machine that might be connected directly to our brains. “The ultimate search engine is something as smart as people—or smarter,” Page said in a speech a few years back. “For us, working on search is a way to work on artificial intelligence.” In a 2004 interview with Newsweek, Brin said, “Certainly if you had all the world’s information directly attached to your brain, or an artificial brain that was smarter than your brain, you’d be better off.” Last year, Page told a convention of scientists that Google is “really trying to build artificial intelligence and to do it on a large scale.”
它最终会走向何处呢？舍奇·布林和拉里·佩奇这两个才华横溢的年轻人，当初是在斯坦福大学计算机科学攻读博士学位的时候创立了谷歌。他们多次谈到想把他们的搜索引擎变成一个人工智能，一个像HAL那样的机器，可以直接连接到大脑。在几年前的一次演讲中，佩奇说道：“最终的搜索引擎是像人一样聪明的东西，或者比人更聪明。对于我们来说，进行搜索的研究就是进行人工智能的研究的一种方式。” 2004年在接受《新闻周刊》采访时，布林说：“如果全世界的信息都连在你大脑，或者一个比你大脑更聪明的人工脑上面，那你的境况就会非常好。”去年，在一次科学家大会上，佩奇说谷歌是“真的试图构建人工智能，并且大规模地构建”。
Such an ambition is a natural one, even an admirable one, for a pair of math whizzes with vast quantities of cash at their disposal and a small army of computer scientists in their employ. A fundamentally scientific enterprise, Google is motivated by a desire to use technology, in Eric Schmidt’s words, “to solve problems that have never been solved before,” and artificial intelligence is the hardest problem out there. Why wouldn’t Brin and Page want to be the ones to crack it?
对于拥有巨额现金可以支配，雇用着一批计算 机科学家的这两个数学奇才来说，有这样的雄心壮志是很自然的，甚至是令人敬佩的。作为一家本质上的科技公司，按埃里克·施密特的话来说，谷歌有着利用技术 的动因，“来解决以前从未得到解决的问题”，而人工智能则是尚未解决的最为困难的问题。布林和佩奇怎么会不想当解决这个难题的人呢？
Still, their easy assumption that we’d all “be better off” if our brains were supplemented, or even replaced, by an artificial intelligence is unsettling. It suggests a belief that intelligence is the output of a mechanical process, a series of discrete steps that can be isolated, measured, and optimized. In Google’s world, the world we enter when we go online, there’s little place for the fuzziness of contemplation. Ambiguity is not an opening for insight but a bug to be fixed. The human brain is just an outdated computer that needs a faster processor and a bigger hard drive.
然而，他们这个如果我们的大脑得到人工智能 的补充甚至取代我们就会境况很好的假设却令人不安。它表达出一种观念，即智能是机械过程的产物，是一系列可以孤立、测量和优化的离散步骤。在谷歌的世界 里，我们上网时所进入的这个世界，没有任何空间让人们进行模糊的沉思。歧义不是一个通向独到见解的出口，而是一个必须修正的程序错误。人脑只不过是一台落 伍的电脑，需要更快的处理器和更大的硬盘。
The idea that our minds should operate as high-speed data-processing machines is not only built into the workings of the Internet, it is the network’s reigning business model as well. The faster we surf across the Web—the more links we click and pages we view—the more opportunities Google and other companies gain to collect information about us and to feed us advertisements. Most of the proprietors of the commercial Internet have a financial stake in collecting the crumbs of data we leave behind as we flit from link to link—the more crumbs, the better. The last thing these companies want is to encourage leisurely reading or slow, concentrated thought. It’s in their economic interest to drive us to distraction.
这种我们的大脑应当像高速数据处理器那样运 行的想法不仅被根植于互联网的运行当中，它也是网络商业活动的主导模式。我们在网上冲浪的速度越快，点击的链接越多，浏览的页面越多，谷歌和其它公司就获 得越多的机会来收集我们的信息，提供给我们越多的广告。商业网络的大多数所有者都有着经济利益在里面，来收集我们从一个链接快速跳到另一个链接时留下的点 滴信息——我们留下的信息越多对他们越好。这些公司最不愿意做的事情就是鼓励你悠闲缓慢的浏览或者全神贯注的思考。让我们注意力分散符合他们的经济利益。
Maybe I’m just a worrywart. Just as there’s a tendency to glorify technological progress, there’s a countertendency to expect the worst of every new tool or machine. In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates bemoaned the development of writing. He feared that, as people came to rely on the written word as a substitute for the knowledge they used to carry inside their heads, they would, in the words of one of the dialogue’s characters, “cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful.” And because they would be able to “receive a quantity of information without proper instruction,” they would “be thought very knowledgeable when they are for the most part quite ignorant.” They would be “filled with the conceit of wisdom instead of real wisdom.” Socrates wasn’t wrong—the new technology did often have the effects he feared—but he was shortsighted. He couldn’t foresee the many ways that writing and reading would serve to spread information, spur fresh ideas, and expand human knowledge (if not wisdom).
也许我只是杞人忧天。正如人们有着美化技术进步的倾向，人们也有担心每一种新工具或新机器的坏处的另一种相反倾向。在柏拉图的《对话 费德罗篇》中，苏格拉底表达出其对于文字发展的不满，担心当人们开始依赖文字来替代原来 储存于脑海中的知识的时候，用对话中另外一个人物的话来说，人们就会“不再运用他们的记忆力，从而变得健忘”。而且由于他们能够“无需指引就可以获得大量 信息”，他们就会“在通常实际上十分无知的情况下被认为很有知识”，他们的脑子里就会“塞满虚假的智慧而不是真的智慧”。苏格拉底说的没错——新的技术通 常带来它所担忧的后果——但是他过于短视，他没有预见到在很多方面，写作和阅读会传播信息、激发新思想、拓展人类的知识（甚至智慧）。
The arrival of Gutenberg’s printing press, in the 15th century, set off another round of teeth gnashing. The Italian humanist Hieronimo Squarciafico worried that the easy availability of books would lead to intellectual laziness, making men “less studious” and weakening their minds. Others argued that cheaply printed books and broadsheets would undermine religious authority, demean the work of scholars and scribes, and spread sedition and debauchery. As New York University professor Clay Shirky notes, “Most of the arguments made against the printing press were correct, even prescient.” But, again, the doomsayers were unable to imagine the myriad blessings that the printed word would deliver.
15世纪古腾堡的印刷厂也曾让人恨得咬牙切齿。意大利人文主义者Hieronimo Squarciafico担 心书籍随便可以得到会导致智力懒惰，使人们“不那么用功”，从而削弱人们的脑力。另有一些人则认为，这些花费颇少印刷出来的书籍和大开本报纸会削弱宗教的 权威，贬低学者和书吏的工作，散布煽动性和不道德的言论。正如纽约大学教授克雷·谢奇所说：“反对印刷厂的大部分观点都是正确的，甚至是很有先见之明。” 但是，再一次，这些灾难预言者没能想到印刷能够给人们带来的无数福祉。
So, yes, you should be skeptical of my skepticism. Perhaps those who dismiss critics of the Internet as Luddites or nostalgists will be proved correct, and from our hyperactive, data-stoked minds will spring a golden age of intellectual discovery and universal wisdom. Then again, the Net isn’t the alphabet, and although it may replace the printing press, it produces something altogether different. The kind of deep reading that a sequence of printed pages promotes is valuable not just for the knowledge we acquire from the author’s words but for the intellectual vibrations those words set off within our own minds. In the quiet spaces opened up by the sustained, undistracted reading of a book, or by any other act of contemplation, for that matter, we make our own associations, draw our own inferences and analogies, foster our own ideas. Deep reading, as Maryanne Wolf argues, is indistinguishable from deep thinking.
因此，对，你应该对我的怀疑论调持怀疑态 度。也许那些认为互联网的批评者不过是阻碍技术进步的勒德分子或者怀旧主义者的人会被证明是正确的，从我们超级活跃、填饱数据的大脑将会涌现一个知识发现 与普遍智慧的黄金时期。然而还有一点，网络不是字母，尽管它也许会取代印刷术，网络产生全然不同的东西。那种一页一页的印刷纸张所带来的深入阅读是很有价 值的，不仅仅是因为我们从作者的话语中获取到了知识，而是因为这些话语在我们大脑中所激起的知识共鸣。在持续且不受干扰的阅读一本书籍、或者任何沉思活动 所给我们打开的那一片宁静空间中，对于作者所陈之事，我们进行自己的联想，做出自己的类比和推断，形成我们自己的思想。正如玛丽安妮·沃尔夫所说，深入阅 读跟深入思考密不可分。
If we lose those quiet spaces, or fill them up with “content,” we will sacrifice something important not only in our selves but in our culture. In a recent essay, the playwright Richard Foreman eloquently described what’s at stake:
如果我们失去那些宁静的空间，或者用“内容“将它们填满，我们将牺牲掉不仅我们自身还有我们文化中一些非常重要的东西。在最近的一篇文章里，剧作家理查德·福尔曼非常雄辩地刻画了面临的风险：
I come from a tradition of Western culture, in which the ideal (my ideal) was the complex, dense and “cathedral-like” structure of the highly educated and articulate personality—a man or woman who carried inside themselves a personally constructed and unique version of the entire heritage of the West. [But now] I see within us all (myself included) the replacement of complex inner density with a new kind of self—evolving under the pressure of information overload and the technology of the “instantly available.”
我所受的熏陶是西方文化传统，在这种传统中理想（我的理想）是教育程度非常高的、能说会道的人所构成的十分复杂、浓厚、像教堂一样的结构——男人或者女人，其内心都有一个他/她所构建的整个西方传统的独特版本。[但是现在]我在我们中间（包括我自己）看到我们内心那种复杂的浓厚系统已经被一种新的自我所取代，这种自我在信息过载和立等可得的技术压力下不断演化。
As we are drained of our “inner repertory of dense cultural inheritance,” Foreman concluded, we risk turning into “‘pancake people’—spread wide and thin as we connect with that vast network of information accessed by the mere touch of a button.”
当我们“内在的浓厚文化传承库藏”被排干后，福尔曼总结道，我们就在冒成为“‘薄饼人’的风险——在我们仅需轻点鼠标按键就跟庞大的信息网络相连的时候铺得太广太薄”。
I’m haunted by that scene in 2001. What makes it so poignant, and so weird, is the computer’s emotional response to the disassembly of its mind: its despair as one circuit after another goes dark, its childlike pleading with the astronaut—“I can feel it. I can feel it. I’m afraid”—and its final reversion to what can only be called a state of innocence. HAL’s outpouring of feeling contrasts with the emotionlessness that characterizes the human figures in the film, who go about their business with an almost robotic efficiency. Their thoughts and actions feel scripted, as if they’re following the steps of an algorithm. In the world of 2001, people have become so machinelike that the most human character turns out to be a machine. That’s the essence of Kubrick’s dark prophecy: as we come to rely on computers to mediate our understanding of the world, it is our own intelligence that flattens into artificial intelligence.
《2001：太空奥德赛》里的那个场景让我备受煎熬。这场景之所以如此深刻、如此怪异，是那台计算机对其大脑被拆解所做出的情感反应：当一个接一个电路断电时它所表现出来的深深绝望，它在宇航员戴夫面前那孩童般的恳求——“我能感觉得到！我能感觉得到！我害怕！”——还有它最终回复到只能称为纯真的状态。HAL的情感发泄跟电影里人的那种冷漠无情形成鲜明对照，那些人以机器人般的效率干着手头的活计。他们的思想和行为让人感觉到是在遵循预先设定的指令，好像在按照一个算法的步骤在行事。在2001年的世界，人们已经变得如此像机器，以至于大多数人物结果都成了机器。斯坦利·库布里克黑色预言的实质在于：当我们依赖电脑作为理解世界的媒介时，实际上是我们自己的智能蜕变成了人工智能。
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